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Abstract 
The ‘fourth freedom’ of freedom of movement of persons – somewhat misleadingly labelled ‘European 
citizenship’ – lay at the normative heart of the European project. Although sceptics have often 
suggested it was part of the building of a European fortress, or even a last gasp of elite European 
colonial privilege, the essential point of EU freedom of movement was its revolutionary introduction of 
a regionally expansive non-discrimination by nationality, going well beyond established abstract 
notions of ‘personhood’ and human rights on which other global egalitarian movements depend. For 
sure, it had been battered by roll back in national courts, suspension of Schengen, and new external 
borderings, well before the Brexit vote. Yet the practice of the fourth freedom in terms of everyday 
transactions and interactions struck at the heart of the core of the modern Hobbesian nation-state: its 
sovereignty to decide on the boundaries of its own, increasingly de-territorialised, population, which 
was also its power to shore up the most potent source of global inequalities—the birthright lottery 
which protects the ‘wealth of nations’ and the privileges of democratic ‘peoples’ from the unbounded 
effects of de-territorialised mobilities. As we are also seeing – and hearing among many ostensibly 
progressive academic voices – the putatively egalitarian voice of people’s democracy, can be used to 
further bolster the shrinkage of moral community within the nation-state. The essay takes upon itself to 
evaluate what is being lost normatively in terms of the return of the national – methodologically as 
much as politically – as the slow motion car crash of Brexit and after takes place.  
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Brexit: a requiem for the post-national society? 
Adrian Favell 
 
It might be argued that one of the limits of EUrope that has been revealed most 
starkly by Brexit are the EU’s ‘normative power’ claims to represent universalisable 
political values (Manners 2002)—that is, values beyond the nation-state. Most leading 
EU scholars are of a generation and career formation which viewed the EU as the best 
likely vehicle of carrying forward what was left of the ‘enlightenment project’, amidst 
the sharp breakdown in the 1970s and 80s of belief in utopian teleologies, heralded by 
post-modern and post-colonial thought. The European ‘dream of the nineties’ (for that 
is what it was) was most famously articulated in the writings of Habermas and Beck 
on post-national ideals and the cosmopolitan potential of the EU (Habermas 1998,  
Beck and Grande 2007; see also Delanty and Rumford 2005, Delanty 2009). Yet, the 
most potent ‘Leave’ arguments articulated in university debates around the UK before 
the referendum, were those by agitated, internationalist-minded left wing students: 
aware they might be losing the rights of European citizenship, but prepared to say that 
the EU’s regional protectionism had been a disaster for agriculture and other forms of 
domestic industry in the developing world, as well as for the graphically desperate 
migrants seeking to find a way through the heavily policed, security cordon in the 
Mediterranean imposed by EU agencies such as Frontex, and washing up on Greek, 
Italian and Spanish shores. What on Earth could be ‘post-national’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ 
about such politics? 
 
In this essay, I acknowledge this critical question, while mounting a normative 
defence of the core ‘post-national’ claim at the heart of the EU project: the idea of the 
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‘fourth freedom’, or the freedom of movement of persons (Favell 2014). Little may be 
said perhaps in response to some the EU’s neo-colonial ‘empire’- like effects on the 
development of the Global South, or the exclusionary drift of its North-South border 
politics; but other plausible counterfactuals suggest far worse versions of Europe-in-
the-world, as well as of other increasingly likely scenarios of international power 
politics. The return of an unashamed political nationalism in Europe, obviously, 
negates directly the validity of post-national claims. But perhaps even more insidious 
are the effects of methodological nationalism – that is, the in-built bias in most social 
science research to assume the nation-state as the fundamental functional and 
normative unit of politics and society (Beck 2000; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) 
– in discussing progressive aspects of the European project. This was notably present 
even among cosmopolitan scholars – in reified ideas of European identity and 
citizenship that projected nationally-rooted conceptions to a supra-national scale – 
and is now again strongly present among progressive voices seeking a return to more 
notionally egalitarian national scale welfarist social democracies. The allure of these 
utopias have also facilitated the return of the national as the ‘natural’ horizon of 
normative power: the apparent triumph of conventional political demography 
inscribed in the claims of sovereignty and ‘people’s democracy’ that have carried 
Britain to the brink of Brexit, and the EU towards potential dissolution.                                                          
 
 
The EU and Global Inequalities 
 
The EU as ‘enlightenment project’ was clearly at risk if its impact on global 
inequalities could be seen as negative. As defined starkly in the work of World Bank 
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economist Branko Milanovic (2011), the EU’s self-sustaining protectionism (on 
agriculture, especially) and its approach to restraining South-North migration look to 
be very much part of the problem not the solution, particularly as the liberal optimism 
of the 1990s about development went sour in the following decade (de Haas 2010). 
There are now a plurality of political sociologists willing to argue that European 
integration has also in fact exacerbated inequality within European societies: the 
‘Euroclash’ of the ‘winners and losers’ of globalisation at a regional scale (Fligstein 
2008; Kriesi et al 2008; Emmenegger et al 2012; Beckfield 2019). This verdict may 
prove dangerously insular, if the point is only to affirm the equality claims of the 
(white, native) ‘left behind’ of the rich West as victims of ‘neo-liberalism’, with no 
cross-reference to Milanovic’s rather mixed global big picture on global inequality 
since 1990, which partly emphasised the rise of new global middles classes—in 
China, South East Asia, India, Turkey, Brazil, and so on. Perhaps the (alleged) angst 
of Euro-American working classes (Gest 2016), is that these (mostly) black and 
brown people around the world are now in fact catching them up? Should we really 
pity those white natives ‘left behind’ in their own rich, highly developed countries, 
while their own highly globalised elites made off with all the money? This, rather 
provincially-focused verdict, appears to be the message of a wave of ‘anti-liberal’ 
post-Brexit analysts in the UK (Goodhart 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; 
Kaufmann 2018), offering analytical apologetics for the frank neo-fascism expressed 
by much of the new populist politics.  
 
Leaving aside this debate, the EU’s righteous ‘post-national’ claims are certainly 
going to look self-regarding and hypocritical, if it can be argued that the European 
project normatively was, in the end, only for Europeans and only about preserving 
	 5	
European privilege—as ‘Eurocentric’ as post-colonial and decolonial critics have 
always charged the self-regarding, abstract ideals of European modernity to be 
(Mignolo 2011).  
 
To this charge, Brexit poses the potential of a counterfactual. Were any of the left 
wing idealists voting ‘Leave’ in the UK – along, covertly, it is suspected, with long 
time anti-EU Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn – right in thinking that a vote for Brexit 
could help deliver a fairer, more globally-minded, Europe? It is doubtful. Talk of 
Global Britain is for most of the politicians articulating this vision, nothing but a 
cover for an ‘Empire 2.0’ operation, as nicely characterised by Kehinde Andrews 
(2016). But the strong suspicion that the EU was nothing but an updated replication of 
European colonial privilege in the world (along with its universaling ‘normative 
power’ pretentions), was surely not lost on the still unclear numbers of British BME 
voters who decided to vote with the Leave camp—and despite its often blatant white 
English St.George iconography. When they did, they usually cited the blatant inequity 
of freedom of movement rights for EU citizens that had, they thought, locked out 
family and friends from the New Commonwealth via the ever more draconian anti-
immigration laws against non-EU citizens, developed through the New Labour years 
to Theresa May’s ‘hostile environment’ of the 2010s (Ehsan 2017). 
 
There is perhaps little to say in defence in the EU’s political economy of agriculture 
subsidies and its impact world wide. Nor can there be much normative justification 
mustered to defend how the EU enabled police, military and state border agencies 
from coordinating laws and policy practices and utilising ever more advanced 
technologies in trying to secure the self-styled European fortress, amidst the chaos of 
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its response to the refugee crisis. But of course the counterfactual here has to be how a 
different Europe of uneasily independent sovereign nation-states would have 
combined to enforce collective economic interests or preserve the privilege of its rich 
populations and territory in an unequal world? Would a Europe-of-the-nations put its 
exploitative, dominant position any less ‘first’ than Donald Trump’s nationalist 
America? If history is any guide, Europe’s track record in the world prior to its 
embrace of a cosmopolitan mission in the post World War Two era is a salutary 
reminder. The old Europe of industrial might and imperial power was hardly in a 
better place to deliver the enlightenment values of its philosophers than the ‘new old 
Europe’ of Community and Union (to echo, argumentatively, Anderson 2011). Nor, in 
any credible political view could it be imagined that a more democratic – or even a 
plurally populist demoi-cratic (Nikolaidis 2018) – European Union, in which peoples 
and their national political parties were allowed to articulate more directly their 
preference on their global economic interests, population change, or the global 
redistribution of their historical wealth, would ever deliver a fairer, more equitable 
‘post-national’ arrangement, or be more likely to welcome asylum seekers and 
poverty migrants from the East or South with open arms. On these points, the attempt 
to build an enlightened, rational law and bureaucracy based, collective governance of 
otherwise rapacious European sovereign economies, surely offered more hope, 
however tepid a version of internationalist liberal capitalism it posed—as I will argue 
further below.   
 
For the time being, other hyper- or anti- capitalist alternatives beckon. A post-EU 
Europe could resemble – in its more successful North-Western parts – the kind of 
offshore, unfettered dream of anarchist global libertarians—returning us to a sharply 
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hierarchical world of imperial diversity and great power maneuvering, run by elite 
castes. Or, if we are true believers, after the ‘neo-liberal’ European Union has 
collapsed, we may wait for the rise of a re-nationalised socialist Europe, in which 
Corbynista and Podemos style parties rise to power to implement a new 
internationalist globalism—yet somehow minus the global institutions which 
sustained the evil order of global banking, finance and dependent development. If his 
Buying Time (2014) proves, as some think, the definitive Critique of Political 
Economy of our own troubled times, we may await statues of Wolfgang Streeck in 
proud national capitals, where once there were statues of Marx and Engels (a 
discussion pursued in Favell 2014 and Parker 2017).  
 
 
European Citizenship as Social Closure? 
 
Leaving aside this speculation, it does still need to be asked what claim can the EU 
make, such as it was, to have been in any sense a cosmopolitan project – given the 
blatant Eurocentricity of its territorial membership? European citizenship – attributed 
solely via national citizenship to its holders (Hansen 1998) – clearly negated the non-
membership of others who were not EU nationals—as do all formal citizenships as 
forms of ‘social closure’ (Brubaker 1992). The EU for many years made a virtue of 
this membership as the foundation of a constitutional pan-European identity that 
would transcend the bounded form of the national. Certainly, republican voices – 
Habermas uppermost – saw it so: as the foundation of some kind of grand European 
democratic superstate. Its cosmopolitan constitutional ‘unity in diversity’ would 
anchor its ‘normative power’ (see Delanty in this volume ??). A Europe of citizens, 
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identifying with and sustaining a benign, enlightened federal power, driven by all 
inclusive, rational institutions, influencing the world as a benign, imperial exemplar. 
On the way towards some United Nations (only: there already was a United Nations, 
with its own hubris about universalisable cosmopolitanism; see Mazower 2013).  
 
European citizenship thus implied a teleology, and as such a ‘people’ of peoples, that 
could only be as diverse as its constituent populations. Internally, much was needed 
before any kind of ‘starting line’ on non-discrimination towards ethnic and racial 
minorities – notably Europe’s very large constitutive muslim population – might be 
realisable (Niessen 2000); many national member states’ very patchy track record on 
anti-discrimination and treatment of minorities, and significant differences in 
campaign goals between representatives of different migrant and minority voices 
across the continent, held this back for years (Guiraudon 2001). Meanwhile, 
‘migration management’ to the exterior was instituted, and in the 1990s was also 
largely still dedicated to enlightened, ‘opening not closing’ ideas about porous, 
interactive, cooperative borders with neighbours, and win-win-win 
mobility/demography/development goals. However, progress towards an equal 
inclusion of Third Country nationals – post-national rights for all on the basis of 
residence (Kostakopoulou 2008) – remained very slow. The EU remained a post-
national club paradoxically which required naturalisation to a EU member nationality 
in order to access free movement benefits.    
 
The EU’s impact on global inequalities via a ‘post-national’ redistribution of rights 
and opportunities in a more gently integrating global world economy was thus largely 
limited to its economic effects, not those thus might have been extended via more 
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extensive recognition of human rights protection for foreigners (Jacobson 1996). Yet, 
the ideal of neighborhood policies and (in particular) the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership could be argued as mildly benovolent – at least in comparison to the 
blatantly empire-like exploitation of the planet’s population and productive resources 
pursued by the US (Hardt and Negri 2000), or (in a different way), ‘Belt and Road’ 
China (Shambaugh 2013). But any effects on global inequalities could only be 
incremental, as fast as the straight-out-of Adam Smith prescribed win-win-win 
development in the wealth of nations might allow, via foreign direct investment, fair 
trade, migrant remittances, brain circulation and rising middle classes, and assuming 
no distorting mercantilist exploitation or monopolisation—and all this from 
enlightened peoples who only two hundred years before had been shipping their black 
and brown colonials around the world as slaves (see especially Hansen and Johnsson 
2014 on the EU’s hidden history of ongoing colonialism).  
 
The liberal economic globalist prescription, anchored in (frankly unsustainable) 
growth models at a global scale, was as far as progressive thought got in the 
expansive, idealist 1990s (de Haas 2010). It was the EU as an Economist editorial. 
Europe’s more convincing normative mission was instead trained internally: through 
the effects of the four freedoms, on inequality within and across the European 
territory. European integration was of course premised on the highly optimistic 
assumption of market equilibrium, functional distribution of labour/production, and 
thereby inclusive, equalising, redistributive development across the currency area. 
Economists do believe in this kind of thing; an economic theory of regional 
integration has always driven the Commission’s ideas (Recchi 2015). Miraculously, 
we might say, it worked in some cases, up to a point: the post-Franco case of the re-
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integration and modernising trajectory of Spain (la movida) being the EU’s greatest 
vindication. Further eastward enlargements followed, and the defining geo-political 
triumph of the EU as it was: to transcend the territorial division of the continent 
imposed by the Cold War. Again, only the cynical amongst those most critical to the 
European ‘empire’ being built (i.e., Böröcz and Kovacs 2001), would deny the effects 
on the equality of peoples in Europe of this enlargement. The ‘fourth freedom’, as it 
deserves to be called, put people(s) on the move; and, if and when they were young 
people, seizing opportunity, and moving Europe transactionally, it can only be said 
that it was via these movements East to West that the greatest blow in a century to 
regional inequality – physically, psychologically, ethnically – was delivered. Even 
economically, until it went politically sour at both ends in the 2010s, Polish and 
Romanian pendular and transnational mobilities, and eastwards economic remittances 
and investment, worked very well according to the theory. 
 
Was this ‘fourth freedom’ a zero-sum loss for those not yet, or never to be, part of the 
European club – the ‘non-EU’ populations at the borders and beyond? This is not 
clear, but is worth debating. It is like discussing whether they were also a zero-sum 
like cost to the supposedly ‘left behind’ native populations who faced the presence of 
EU free movement as a competition for jobs or social resources. That ‘competition’ 
with ‘natives’ can in a broad sense be shown to be generally false, although its spatial 
concentration can account for a part of the enmity which arose in some places in 
provincial England (see Portes 2016; Vargos-Silva 2017). Generally though, the place 
of East European movers – consisting also of significant numbers of young educated 
or skilled workers, as well as highly entrepreneurial in nature – was in fact a 
complementary relation. Its negative effects relative to its transformative powers on 
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the British economy and British society, were at least nowhere near any economic 
threshold by which the cosmopolitanism of, say, the British economy in the 1990s and 
2000s could be argued to have been harmful. There may have been some sense of a 
relation of ‘white’ European demand-driven migration replacing some of the global 
migrants – and relatives of British BME citizens – who might have been able to come 
had there not been Theresa May’s draconian hostile environment (Favell 2008a). But 
overall, the fourth freedom was normatively extraordinary because it put something 
new in the world that in fact reinforced the deep, cosmopolitan tendencies embedded 
in anti-racist, anti-discriminatory norms that had shakily emerged in the European 
post war—and most boldly in the UK’s policy and legislation in response to post-
colonial and then global new migrations. 
 
A case can be made then that the fourth freedom of movement of persons, and the 
rights it gave – packaged rather deceivingly under the rubric of ‘European citizenship’ 
– were indeed the instituting of a very real, concrete form of ‘post-national 
membership’ in the famous historical line of T.H.Marshall (1950); and extending 
rather further in their individualising rights-based properties than the fragmented 
‘post-national’ social rights of Third Country Nationals (i.e., the Turkish in 
Germany), identified by Yasemin Soysal in her Limits of Citizenship (1994). The 
Marshallian logic was for the first time taken beyond the nation-state, and rights 
attributed to individuals in ways that could not be limited by nationality (Soysal 
2012). In a country such as the UK, which favoured the economic benefits of a 
genuinely open labour market in most sectors and had heavily policed organisational 
and institutional norms of anti-discrimination, the addition of non-discrimination by 
nationality to these powers had an extraordinary impact. Anti-discrimination law had 
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always suggested this diasporic implication: that in legislating against race, gender, 
ethnic, religious or disability discrimination, it was protecting the individual qua 
individual against the privilege of normal, mainstream national society. In its 
extension to all those present in the territory legally, regardless of origin or length of 
stay – dramatically making discrimination by nationality analogous to all other forms 
of discrimination – it was a direct undermining of the nationalised privilege of 
citizenship as (passport carrying) membership. An argument comes full circle here to 
unify the claims of European non-nationals in the UK, with those articulated famously 
(and tragically, in political terms) by the report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 
(in 2000, known as The Parekh Report), informed by Stuart Hall’s diasporic, post-
national vision of the post-colonial. The UK in the 2000s was therefore on the cusp of 
becoming Europe’s first genuinely post-national society – despite itself, certainly, in 
many ways – and not only because, as documented (in)famously by the right wing 
demographer, David Coleman (2016), Britain would soon no longer be a majority 
‘white British’ society. When the Daily Telegraph led the vitriol against the Parekh 
report before its publication, it knew very well what it was fighting: its struggle 
against the diasporic, post-national and cosmopolitan vision of multi-ethnic Britain in 
2000, was one and the same thing as its struggle against the post-national and 
cosmopolitan consequences of EU freedom of movement fifteen years later. New 
Labour panicked at the nationalist backlash; and a crucial progressive dimension was 
lost forever from their transformative vision. Officially, then, the party got cold feet 
over diasporic multiculturalism (Joppke and Morawska 2003); instead the 
transformation took the form of open door migration policies that followed the East 
European accessions of 2004, and (with more restriction) 2007. 
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The Triumph of Political Demography 
 
Britain as a migration country certainly was, on the ground, utterly transformed by the 
highly mobile, mostly youthful, and generally white, new European migrations of the 
2000s. We are now seeing the consequences of undoing the post-national rights that 
many of these migrants enjoyed—as Brexit will do. Obviously, EU nationals in the 
UK will become outside ‘im-migrants’ and ‘foreigners’ again, rendered unequal by 
definition to ‘nationals’, rejoining some laborious path to equal membership, at some 
unclear point in the future, if they accept and are able to ‘naturalise’. Until then, they 
will find their rights to equal treatment re-differentiated by skills and education, 
‘whiteness’, cultural proximity, South-isms and East-isms again; i.e. not treated as 
equal ‘citizens’—as they had been, as post-national ‘free movers’. Even in some of 
the most sophisticated academic debates, these populations routinely and falsely have 
long been referred to as ‘immigrants’ or part of ‘immigration’ policy (see, for 
example, the public opinion analysts who have explained Brexit in terms of ‘EU 
immigration’: Evans and Mellon 2015, Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; on this, see 
Favell and Barbulescu 2018). The sovereign island nation has resolutely been unable 
to understand the porous, transient, transactional and transnational nature of the 
European mobilities its economy and society so openly welcomed. EU non-nationals 
had already become ‘immigrants’ well before Nigel Farage plastered his infamous 
‘breaking point’ image on a lorry in London—the threatening hordes of Syrian male 
asylum seekers in Central Europe coming our way (a group also not, legally speaking, 
immigrants). This reflex of methodological nationalism – of seeing all actual and 
potential resident foreigners as ‘immigrants’ – is overwhelming in public discourse. 
And the more visibly ‘Eastern’ or racially distinct the population was, the more they 
	 14	
were said to be unwanted ‘immigration’. Even some supposedly progressive 
campaigns in their name (such as the misguided, progressively intended, ‘I am an 
immigrant’ campaign), fell into the same methodologically nationalist trap. Britain on 
all sides could only imagine discourse about international mobilities in nationalist 
terms: of ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreigners’ we could (still) welcome to this island nation. 
And so free movers living in this corner of Europe will after Brexit be just foreigners 
again, with no right to be on UK territory or claim equality of treatment, unless they 
accept to naturalise ‘British’ (if they are able—which is far from given due to the 
rules and expense). In order to access and maintain the normative benefits of equal 
membership, they will be forced to ‘integrate’ as British citizens—rather than the 
post-national European individuals they had been under freedom of movement laws. 
The default acceptance of methodological nationalism by all sides has rendered this 
notion reasonable to most people: EU non-national residents after Brexit will just 
have to like it or lump it.  
 
It was no coincidence though that this enforcement of the nationalist basis of 
membership in British society should coincide with the surfacing of the Windrush 
scandal, in which children of the first waves of post-war migration to the UK from the 
Caribbean discovered, amidst recent new procudures for checking resident status, that 
they were lacking any proof of British citizenship. In many case, they then faced 
deportation even though they had grown up and lived decades in the UK. Hundreds of 
second generation UK BME residents were thus left high and dry by this exposure of 
the thin-ness of their British empire membership—a direct consequence of the 
harshness of Theresa May’s bureaucratic ‘hostile environment’. BME British, bred 
and socialised on these shores, became visibly, ‘immigrants’ again – British citizens 
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who never had passports being put through the indignity of proving their right to 
reside, alongside all the other ‘immigrants’ questioned about their documentation or 
told to ‘go home’. How quickly the proud veneer of multi-racial Britain was exposed. 
They were part of a post-colonial ‘immigration’ who had so successfully become 
‘Black British’ that it had been unacceptable (since the 1970s) to speak of them as 
‘immigrants’—as so indignantly proven by the ascendent moral argument of Paul 
Gilroy’s Their ‘Aint no Black in the Union Jack (1987). Yet all it took was a 
bureaucratic enforcement of routine national documentation for their British-ness to 
be exposed as less secure than the ‘true’ English people around them; the ones whose 
immaculately white British-ness demographers and other influential commentators 
claim can be traced to ancient roots (Coleman 2016; Collier 2013). Once again an 
‘immigration’ story of ‘foreigners’ crossing a border and settling on the island had to 
be imposed, even though they had all been born as subjects in the British empire, and 
the borders had in fact crossed them (Bhambra 2016). Nearly fifty years in which it 
was incorrect to talk about Commonwealth movers as ‘immigrants’ had been swiftly 
reversed; with pundits and politicians cementing the story by re-imposing false 
progressive narratives—of Britain being a selective immigrant settler nation just like 
Canada, or Australia, seeking a new middle way (Goodhart 2017; Collier 2013).  
 
The fate of the 3 million (EU nationals) in this conceptual trap is a sad one; but a 
bigger casualty surely is the still smouldering notion of Britain as a post-national 
space of diasporas—in which national origin is irrelevant, in which ‘being British’, as 
opposed to being generically non-national something (whether ‘European or ‘Global’, 
or just ‘young’, ‘LGBT’, a ‘goth’, or an ‘Arsenal fan’, or whatever), is an indifferent 
or empty, open category. 
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We all know the manifold post-national identities and interactions of what is often 
called ‘superdiversity’ exist (Vertovec 2007): on the streets, in the city, anywhere in 
fact, where somehow the question ‘where are you from?’ is no longer important, or 
merely a designator of another ‘non-national’ place. One can almost imagine or touch 
this place ethnographically, sitting on the tube in London or walking through Dalston 
market in East London (see Wessendorf 2010). But these realities clearly are 
marginalised in the everyday world by the cognitive infrastructure of ‘democratic’ 
media and politics, in which membership of the discussion, is always national; of a 
‘people’ and society, however diverse, constituted by national membership of an 
island territory. Ironically, for all kinds of reasons, the contemporary UK in the 1990s 
and 2000s, offshore from Europe, but the most Europeanised member state on these 
key dimensions, was the place in Europe where the true normative power of the EU as 
the harbinger of post-national society was being realised. This was put to the ‘people’ 
– as it were, gerrymandered, as the electorate was, to exclude resident ‘foreigners’ – 
in June 2016, and the ‘people’ rejected it. They reasserted sovereignty over a society 
that was indeed, however unstably, partially, imperfectly, no longer theirs (as Nigel 
Farage correctly claimed)—because it had become, in fact, everyone’s. Yet Leviathan 
spoke: the body politic asserted its exclusive unity over the notion of population, 
banishing the constructed foreign to its borders again—the triumph of the political 
over transnational society and demography; or, to put it another way, vindicating the 
triumphant nation-constituting power of political demography. 
 
Our requiem should not overstate the exclusive role of the UK vote on Brexit in 
killing the notion of non-discrimination by nationality in Europe. Already other 
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member states, notably Denmark and Germany, have moved to remove social rights 
of EU non-nationals in their territories, in line with David Cameron’s negotiated opt 
outs for Britain—and this despite Angela Merkel’s continual incantation of the 
inviolability of the four freedoms. European case law has turned away from expansive 
interpretations of EU citizens’ rights in recent year; Schengen open borders have 
frequently become optional whenever states needed or chose to impose borders again 
(on these shifts, see Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser 2018). And, in any case, labour 
markets across most of Europe have always mostly been de facto discriminatory 
towards non-nationals – according to insider credentialism, unionised privileges, or 
simply cultural barriers – which made the genuine openness of much of the British 
labour in the 1900s and 2000s market so remarkable (Favell 2014). The offshore UK 
of these two decades was in fact an exemplar of Europeanisation in this respect, at the 
heart of EU values and regional integration (Gerhards 2007), with London its capital 
(Favell 2008b). That heart may already be moving to Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and 
Berlin, rival cities that will reap the benefit of its unexpected, but very British, 
rejection. 
 
As I have argued, the British dilemma on immigration, as well as its violent attempt to 
de-Europeanise itself with Brexit, reveal the limits of EUrope in several ways. In 
throwing away the fruits of the post-national society that emerged in the 1990s and 
2000s, the ethno-national origins of British (in fact: English) nationhood have been 
exposed: the ‘immigrant’ stigma of EU nationals and the Windrush generation being 
substantially the same fate of all diaspora populations in countries which impose 
complete national ‘integration’ as a condition of full membership. Britain’s failure 
also casts a sharp light on the limitations of a ‘European citizenship’ which has never 
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been able to embrace the post-national rights of resident non-EU nationals, and the 
claims of global inequality beyond the bounds of Europe. Minus the UK, it is likely 
that other member states will drift back towards re-nationalisation and further 
restriction on the remarkable post-national mobilities enabled and extended by the 
‘fourth freedom’: a requiem indeed will be called for.  
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